This paper contributes to the debate about whether or not inflation targeting is compatible with Post Keynesian economics. It does so by developing a model that takes into account the potentially inflationary consequences of interest rate manipulations. Evaluations of the macroeconomic implications of this so-called cost channel of monetary policy are common in the mainstream literature. But this literature uses supply-determined macro models and provides standard optimizing microfoundations for the various ways in which the interest rate can affect mark-ups, prices and ultimately the form of the Phillips curve. Our purpose is to study the implications of different Phillips curves, each embodying the cost channel and derived from Post Keynesian, cost-based-pricing microfoundations, in a monetary-production economy. We focus on the impact of these Phillips curves on macroeconomic stability and the consequent efficacy of inflation and output targeting. Ultimately, our results suggest that the presence of the cost channel is of less significance than the general orientation of the policy regime, and corroborate earlier finding that, in a monetary-production economy, more orthodox policy regimes are inimical to macro stabilization.
Introduction
There has been some intense debate about whether or not inflation targeting is compatible with Post Keynesian economics. As might be expected, several contributors have expressed concerns with the potential real costs (in terms of foregone output and employment) of a singular focus on low inflation as the goal of macroeconomic policy (see, for example, Atesoglu and Smithin, 2006; Rochon and Rossi, 2006) . These concerns become acute when inflation targeting is taken to involve not just the pursuit of low inflation enshrined in a target that public policy authorities credibly and accountably commit to achieve, but also -and more specifically -the dedicated use of monetary policy to achieve this goal. 1 According to Setterfield (2006) , however, Post Keynesian concerns with inflation targeting can be set aside once it is recognized that, by using more and different policy instruments to reconcile the pursuit of low inflation with real macroeconomic policy goals, inflation targeting can be accommodated in a monetary-production economy. 2 Lima & Setterfield (2008) consider further the relationship between inflation targeting and Post Keynesian economics by explicitly taking into account the role of expectations in the inflation process, and by evaluating the impact of different policy reaction functions on the effects of inflation targeting and the stability of macroeconomic equilibrium. Two important results emerge from this analysis. First, the potential compatibility of inflation targeting with a Post Keynesian economy extends to a broader range of policy interventions than was originally envisaged by Setterfield (2006) . And second, the more orthodox the policy blend becomes in a Post Keynesian 1 See, for example, Mishkin (2002) . Svensson (2010) also identifies inflation targeting with the conduct of monetary policy, but notes that low and/or stable inflation may not be the singular pursuit of the monetary authorities in an inflation targeting regime. 2 See also Davidson (2006) , Palley (2006) , and Sawyer (2006) on the compatibility of inflation targeting and Post Keynesian economics. economy, the more adverse are the consequences for macroeconomic stability and the viability of inflation targeting. 3 But an important omission from Lima and Setterfield (2008) is the cost channel of monetary policy, according to which interest rates affect costs of production and hence (potentially) price dynamics. A second drawback is that Lima and Setterfield's analysis is based on a simple aggregate structural model, the Post Keynesian pedigree of which is justified largely by appeal to heuristics. One of the purposes of this paper is to provide proper Post Keynesian foundations for the simplified policy model utilized by Lima and Setterfield (2008) . These foundations take into account the potentially inflationary consequences of interest rate manipulations, arising from the fact that interest rates affect firms' debt servicing and hence their costs of production and (potentially) their pricing decisions. 4 Hence a second purpose of the paper is to study macroeconomic stability and the efficacy of inflation targeting in a monetaryproduction economy characterized by the cost channel of monetary policy. Evaluations of the macroeconomic implications of the cost channel are common in the mainstream literature. But this literature uses supply-determined macro models and provides standard optimizing microfoundations for the various ways in which the interest rate can affect mark-ups, prices and 3 This second result bears a striking resemblance to that of Isaac (1991) . The relationship between the analysis conducted in this paper and that found in Isaac (1991) is discussed in detail in sub-section 2(iv) below. 4 A recent survey jointly conducted by nine major Eurosystem national central banks covering more than 11,000 firms showed that prices are mostly set following some markup rule (Fabiani et al., 2006) . Firms were also asked to assign scores between 4 (greater importance) and 1 (minor importance) to three main cost factors according to their importance for price increases. Suggestively, financial costs received an average score of 2.2, while with 3.0 and 3.1 the average scores of labor costs and raw material costs, respectively, were not that much higher.
ultimately the form of the Phillips curve. 5 Our purpose is to study the implications of different specifications of a Phillips curve, embodying the cost channel of monetary policy, derived from Post Keynesian, cost-based-pricing microfoundations in Lima and Setterfield (2010) . While the inflationary (and therefore potentially self-defeating) consequences of raising interest rates in an effort to fight inflation have been emphasized by several Post Keynesian authors, 6 scant (if any) attention has been paid to them in the literature debating whether or not inflation targeting is compatible with Post Keynesian economics. Ultimately, then, we seek to analyze the stability of macroeconomic equilibrium and the consequent possibilities for successful inflation and output targeting in a demand-determined economy characterized by the cost channel of monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we outline the structural model on which our analysis is based. Section 3 then examines the consequences of the cost channel of monetary policy for macroeconomic stability and the efficacy of inflation and output targeting in a monetary-production economy. Finally, section 4 concludes.
The Model and its Foundations i) Some preliminary profit accounting
We begin by defining enterprise profits as:
5 Interestingly, this literature yields a single specification of the Phillips curve embodying the cost channel -a further point of contrast with our own analysis (see also Lima and Setterfield, 2010) . 6 See, for example, Wray (2007) .
where П E denotes enterprise profits and П denotes gross profits (both in nominal terms), and ιD denotes payments to rentiers (ι is the nominal rate of interest and D is the nominal stock of debt).
Deflating by the price level, P, we get:
where an R-subscript denotes the real value of a variable. The expression in equation [2] can be thought of as the "real cash flow" of firms.
Since the model we are constructing is of an environment characterized by inflation, we will observe the steady depreciation of D R over time, ceteris paribus. We assume that firms will take this into account when they calculate enterprise profits. Note that since:
where p is the rate of inflation, so that the depreciation of real debt over time due to inflation can be written as:
Adding the expression for d in [3] to the cash flow concept of (real) enterprise profits in [2], we get:
The concept of enterprise profits in [2a] can now be thought of as the "real net profits" of firms.
Finally , deflating [2a] by the capital stock, K, we get:
where ζ = D R /K is the debt to capital stock ratio, which we take as given in the short run.
Equation [4] gives us the real rate of enterprise profits which, as will become clear in what follows, enters into the investment and pricing decisions of firms.
ii) Expectations
Our theory of expectations is based on the work of Gerrard (1994 , 1995 ) and Dequech (1999 . For any variable x that decision makers are attempting to forecast, we write:
where:
with Ψ denoting decision makers' information set, Θ denoting their animal spirits and Φ denoting their creativity. The idea here is that in an environment of uncertainty, in which there is no time-invariant "true model" on which to base forecasts, expectations are a product of what decision makers do know (or think they know) about the structure of the data-generating process (the incomplete information set, Ψ), the capacity of decision makers to anticipate innovations that produce novel change in the structure of the data-generating process (captured by their creativity, Φ) and decision makers' animal spirits (Θ), which influence expectations via their effects on "spontaneous optimism" (see Dequech, 1999, p.419) . Hence, as in equation [5] , x e is conditional on a vector Ω that reflects each of these influences -information, creativity and animal spirits -on expectations.
Note that, in addition to their impact on expectations, animal spirits exert a second and separate influence on decision making, as in equation [5] . This is because in an environment of uncertainty, behaviour depends not only on expectations themselves, but also on the confidence with which these expectations are held. A change in animal spirits, by altering decision makers' aversion to and/or perception of uncertainty, can alter the confidence that decision makers have in any given set of expectations, and hence their behaviour (Dequech, 1999, p.419) . This exemplifies what Gerrard (1994 Gerrard ( , 1995 describes as the "two-step" nature of decision making under uncertainty: decision makers first formulate a "most probable forecast" (captured by x e in equation [5] ), and then assess the "credence" of this forecast before deciding how to act. In this way, anything that affects the "credence" of a forecast can alter behaviour quite independently of changes in the forecast itself. 7 In this paper, we abstract from these dynamics for the sake of simplicity, taking animal spirits as given. 8 7 The obvious contrast here is with the canonical version of rational expectations, where ' ( ) e x E x = Ψ and ' Ψ constitutes a complete information set (including the time-invariant "true model" of the process generating x), and factors such as animal spirits exert no influence on behaviour either indirectly (via x e ) or directly. The key characteristic of rational expectations is that they cannot be systematically wrong. In contrast, expectations formed under uncertainty on the basis of the incomplete information set ψ can be systematically wrong, and decision makers are aware of this -hence the role and importance of the second step in the decision making process described above. 8 In this way, we are "locking up without ignoring" (Kregel, 1976) some of the dynamics of a Post Keynesian economy in an effort to focus attention on other dynamics in a "conditionally" or "provisionally" closed system (see Setterfield, 1997 , 2003 and Chick and Caserta, 1997 . Closure is conditional or provisional in the precise sense that it depends on our ability to treat as unchanging certain features of the economy that are, in principle, subject to change over time. Note that the need to introduce such conditional closure cannot be avoided by simply adding more equations until our model is expressed in terms of Lucasian "deep parameters" and absolute closure is achieved. These "deep parameters" are assumed not to exist and the economy is, instead, treated as an open system (see Lawson, 1995) . Indeed, this is understood to be the source of the fundamental uncertainty that decision makers face in a Post Keynesian economy.
Alternatively, the assumption that Θ = Θ can be interpreted as an "equilibrium of action" (Chick, 2002) , in which even in the absence of evidence confirming the realization of expectations, decision makers find no basis in current economic events to change the credence they attach to these expectations.
In order to render equation [5] explicit, we appeal to the claims originally made by Keynes (1936 Keynes ( , 1937 that, in an environment of uncertainty, expectations will be heavily influenced by recent events and social conventions. In light of this insight, we write: 
Note that in this particular case, k will be decreasing in the transparency of policy makers' target rate of inflation, and the credibility of their commitment to achieve this inflation target.
iii) The AD curve 
Finally, drawing on the theory of expectations outlined in the previous sub-section (and again assuming Г = 1), we write:
is the salient, conventional value of u that (given v and K) is derived from the target level of output y T that informs policy making. 12 We also write:
Note that the above expression for the expected rate of profit features the actual (rather than expected) wage share, ω . In sub-section 2(iv) below, our approach to modelling wage and price dynamics will imply that the equilibrium wage share -and hence, by definition, the equilibrium size of the markup -is consistent with firms' target wage share, and hence can be treated as a constant. 12 In this model, the parameter y T is understood to be a policy choice. Policy makers, however, may interpret y T as a "natural" level of output. The consequences of this possibility are investigated in sub-section 2(vi) below. which, setting k ι = 1 on the basis that there is no salient conventional value of ι that can be derived from policy makers' behaviour, 13 ( , u = u -1 , and ι = ι -1 , we arrive at: 14
Finally, since:
As will become clear, this is consistent with the policy rules introduced in sub-section 2(vi) below, in which the value of the nominal interest rate is indeterminate. If firms' decision making involves a normal rate of interest, ι n -on which, see sub-section 2(iv) below -then it is plausible to conjecture that by virtue of the introduction of k ι into the first of these derivatives. But since k ι is assumed constant, this would have no material effect on the dynamical analysis in section 3. 14 Note that if k u = 1 (so that u e = u -1 as in the standard Kaleckian model), then the expression in [12] reduces to:
It is conventional to assume that , so that the outcome in the expression above is both positive and stable. Note that if the first of these conditions holds, the numerator in [12] will necessarily be positive and it must be true that
, since k u it follows on the basis of [12] that:
This aggregate demand curve can be written in simplified form as:
The precise relationship between the parameters of [14] and those of equation [13] will be made clear following the discussion of pricing behaviour below, since (as will become clear) the latter impinges upon this relationship.
iv) Wage and price dynamics
Our approach to modelling wage and price dynamics is informed by the theory of target return pricing, in conjunction with insights from the conflicting claims theory of inflation. 15
Throughout our analysis, we assume that firms set prices in conjunction with the equation:
where P is the price level, κ is the gross mark up (one plus the percentage margin for gross profits), W is the nominal wage and a is the labour to output ratio (which is assumed fixed). In < 1 by assumption. In other words, the standard Kaleckian existence and stability conditions suffice to ensure the existence and stability of the equilibrium rate of capacity utilization in [12] . 15 The analysis in this sub-section is based on Lima and Setterfield (2010) . Rowthorn (1977) develops an early model of conflict inflation, while Lavoie (1992, chpt. 7) and Burdekin and Burkett (1996) provide surveys of the conflicting claims approach. See Lee (1998) and Lavoie (1992, pp.129-33) for discussion of target return pricing procedures, and Lee (1998, p.206) for evidence of the use of target return pricing by firms. Note that target return pricing can be related to the cost plus pricing models of Wood (1975) , Harcourt and Kenyon (1976) and Eichner (1987) that emphasize the influence of investment and growth on the size of the mark up. See, for example, Lavoie (1992, p.133) .
what follows, we explore several possible specifications of [15] , each of which is consistent with the notion that firms' pricing decisions are sensitive to (inter alia) the interest rate. 16 We begin by hypothesizing that:
where ω and ω F are the actual wage share and firms' target wage share, respectively. 17
According to [16] , the mark-up grows in response to any disparity between the actual wage share and firms' target wage share, an idea that is well established in the conflicting-claims literature.
Since it follows from [15] that:
(recalling that a is a constant), substituting [16] into [17] we get:
as our initial description of the rate of inflation.
Appealing once again to conflicting-claims theory, we now write: Together, these expressions imply that:
16 See Lima and Setterfield (2010) for fuller investigation of these and other examples of this cost channel of monetary policy. 17 Since a is exogenously given, the actual (target) wage share is equivalent to the actual (target) real wage, both here and throughout our analysis.
According to equation [19] , the growth of nominal wages depends on inflation expectations, the gap between workers' target wage share and the actual wage share, and both the state of the real economy and the institutional structure of the labour market (which influence the willingness and/or ability of workers to bargain for a higher real wage, and hence the size of τ). 18 An important feature of conflicting claims models of inflation is that their equilibrium solutions describe both the rate of inflation and the value of the wage share. In order to derive an expression for the short-run Phillips curve (SRPC) that is consistent with the equilibrium conditions of the conflicting claims process, we therefore need to consider the situation where the wage share is constant (at its equilibrium value) in order to further our analysis. From the definition of the wage share, a constant wage share implies that p = w (recalling once again that a is constant). Substituting this condition into [18], we get:
In other words, the equilibrium wage share -and hence, by definition, the equilibrium size of κ = So far, however, our model appears to make no connection between interest rates, prices and inflation. But suppose -consistent with the theory of target return pricing -that what is 18 The parameter σ will also likely vary with y and Z, but this is overlooked for the sake of simplicity. 19 It may be more accurate to refer to equation [21] (and the Phillips curves that follow) as quasiSRPCs, since some of the disequilibrium adjustment mechanisms that can be properly associated with the short period, such as the adjustment of ω towards ω F described in [16] and (in subsequent expressions) the adjustment of ι e towards ι, are absent, assumed (for the sake of simplicity) to have been previously resolved. It should be noted that this has no effect on the results reported in the next section. We are grateful to Søren Harck of the University of Aarhus for drawing this matter to our attention. T n u u ≠ -as is plausible in the short run -the it might be argued that both u n and u T should feature in the calculation of firms' utilization expectations, a possibility that has not been taken into account heretofore. However, since both u n and u T are constants in our analysis and will therefore have no effect on the macrodynamics in section 3, we abstract from this possibility for the sake of simplicity. 21 Note that not all variants of target return pricing admit a role for the interest rate in the determination of the mark up in this fashion. See, for example, Lavoie (1992, pp.360-1; 1995) on the pricing theory of Eichner (1987) . 
The "normal" rate of interest may change over time in response to firms' experience of prevailing actual rates of interest (see Lima and Setterfield, 2010, pp.32) . But any impact that this might have on the macrodynamics of the system under construction can be thought of as being approximated by the previous case where ι rather than ι n enters the SRPC, since n ι ι =   is the most extreme form of adjustment of the normal rate of interest in reponse to changes in the actual rate. Indeed, in light of this last observation, unless there is a qualitative difference between the macrodynamics of systems in which the target rate of return is formulated as in [23a] rather than [23] , there would seem to be no point in exploring the impact of other, more gradual adjustments of ι n in response to changes in ι on the properties of the system. But we now also know (from the discussion in sub-section 2(iv) above) that:
and that either:
In other words, any increase (decrease) in the nominal interest rate that causes an increase (decrease) in the actual real interest rate will either reduce (increase) or leave unchanged the value of the wage share, ω, and hence either increase (reduce) or leave unchanged the value of the gross profit share, 1 -ω. 24 In short:
(1 ) 0
And since it follows from [13] that: 25
it therefore follows that the total derivative of y with respect to ι R -and hence the value of δ in equation [14] -is given by:
In other words, if firms pass on interest costs in the form of higher prices, an increase in the interest rate effectively redistributes income from wages to rents. This calls attention to the fact that even though we have assumed that households do not carry debt, it is possible for the wage bargain to be affected by monetary policy. For instance, in this case the possibility arises (following Pivetti 1991) that since the normal profit of the enterprise does not depend on the behaviour of any component of total unit cost other than interest expenses, wage bargaining -in order to have any permanent effect on income distribution -will seek to influence the interest rate. Though we abstract from this possibility in what follows, we would nevertheless identify the relationship between the interest rate, wage formation and hence prices and price inflation as an important topic for further research into the precise workings -and implications for macroeconomic stability -of the cost channel of monetary policy. 
vi) Policy reaction functions
Our model features two policy reaction functions -one describing the pursuit of monetary policy, the second describing adjustments to labour market institutions -which we use to characterize two different macroeconomic policy regimes. 26 Initially, we write:
This (with e p p =   ) corresponds to Lima and Setterfield's (2008) basic Post-Keynesian policy regime, in which monetary policy is used to target output, and labour market institutions are adjusted in an effort to control inflation -in other words, the policy authorities pursue some form of incomes policy. 27 We also consider the "inverted" policy reaction functions:
This (again with 26 For more extensive discussion of these policy reaction functions and other policy regimes associated with them, see Lima and Setterfield (2008) . 27 The idea of adjusting an incomes policy in the pursuit of short-run stabilization may seem strange. But note that in tax-based incomes policies (see, for example, Wallich and Weintraub, 1971) , the policy instrument is a tax rate which could, in principle, be varied in the short run. Again, it may appear odd to think of adjusting labour market institutions in the short run, But note that the sort of "institutions" that policy makers would seek to vary in accordance with [28a] include unemployment benefit generosity and the value of the minimum wage -which are, once again, potentially amenable to change in the short run. Setterfield (2006) defines as the full compatibility of inflation targeting with the underlying structure of the economy: not only are the policy authorities able to both set and achieve an inflation target (establishing the partial compatibility of inflation targeting with the economy), they are able to do so without real costs and hence without thwarting the achievement of any output target set independently of p T (establishing full compatibility). Indeed, the policy authorities can change their inflation target and still meet this target without affecting the real economy (and hence their ability to achieve any freely chosen, as far as inflation is concerned, output target). By the same token, policy makers can also set and pursue an output target without any fear of it having inflationary consequences.
Meanwhile, in an economy described by the same simplified versions of equations [14] ,
[26] and [6a] described above, but with the policy mix given by [27a]-[28a], full compatibility obtains only in exceptional circumstances. In general, the policy authorities set and pursue output and inflation targets that are revealed as the unstable equilibrium configuration of the economy.
Hence even the partial compatibility of inflation targeting with the underlying structure of the economy is lost: the policy authorities are unable to both set and (in general) achieve an inflation target. Only if, by chance, the economy happens to be on the stable arm of its saddle-point will an equilibrium consistent with We now turn to assess the impact of the pairs of policy reaction functions given by 
Equations [ Moreover, this is so no matter how strong the cost channel of monetary policy happens to bei.e., regardless of the size of ε . -we observe the full compatibility of inflation targeting with the underlying structure of the economy. It follows that the cost channel is not disruptive to the functioning of a Post Keynesian economy in which policy is pursued in accordance with [27] and [28] . 30 All of the original results found in Lima and Setterfield (2008) regarding macro stability and the full compatibility of inflation targeting with the structure of the economy still go through.Graphically, the 0 y =  isocline (given by [34] ) is parallel to the p axis, while the 0 p =  isocline (given by [35] ) is positively (negatively) sloped if ε αδ
that is, if the cost-push channel in the Phillips curve (measured by ε ) is stronger (weaker) than the standard demand-pull channel of monetary transmission (measured by αδ ). In either case, since / y y ∂ ∂  is negative, y  undergoes a steady decrease as y increases, so that the sign of y  is positive (negative) below (above) the 
and: cannot be considered economically meaningful. We are therefore left with the conclusion that pursuing a simplified policy orthodoxy in a Post Keynesian economy where the cost channel operates through the effect of the actual nominal interest rate on pricing behaviour is destabilizing. Once again, this is identical to the result in Lima and Setterfield (2008) . This, in turn, suggests that it is the choice of policy regime, rather than the existence and strength of a cost channel, that most seriously affect the functioning of a monetary production economy in which inflation targeting is attempted.
This claim is only reinforced if we reconsider the micro-foundations of the pricing decision and, in so doing, replace the SRPC in [26] It follows from these isoclines that * T y y = and * T p p = , which means that, once again, the equilibrium configuration is characterized by the achievement of both policy targets.
Meanwhile, the matrix J of partial derivatives for this dynamic system, from which the stability properties of the corresponding equilibrium configuration can be computed, is given by: Tr( ) 0 
where, as before: 32 Again, the standard assumptions are that either φ = 1 (full indexation) or else φ < 1 (incomplete indexation). 33 As a final experiment, we analyzed the implications of Lima and Setterfield's (2008, p.460) "full policy orthodoxy" regime for macroeconomic stability and the pursuit of inflation targeting in the presence of the cost channel. This policy regime was found to make the economy unambiguously unstable, regardless of the strength of the cost channel (i.e., the size of ε).
Conclusions
Post Keynesian macroeconomists are inclined to be skeptical of inflation targeting, because of the frequent neglect of the real costs that such policies can entail. According to Lima and Setterfield (2008) , however, it is possible to pursue inflation targeting in a Post Keynesian economy without detrimental real effects, as long as an appropriate policy regime is adopted. But one important shortcoming of these results is Lima and Setterfield's complete neglect of the cost channel of monetary policy, according to which changes in interest rates affect the costs of production and hence (potentially) price dynamics.
The purpose of this paper has been to: a) provide a proper foundation in Post Keynesian macro-and micro-principles for the simplified policy model utilized by Lima and Setterfield; b) incorporate the cost channel of monetary policy into the price dynamics of this model; and c) study the stability of, and efficacy of inflation targeting in, the resulting monetary-production economy, under different (more and less orthodox) policy regimes. The key result that our analysis produces is that Lima and Setterfield's (2008) conclusions survive the introduction of the cost channel. Specifically:
-the appropriate (Post Keynesian) policy mix can successfully stabilize the economy and deliver full compatibility of inflation targeting with the underlying structure of the economy -the more orthodox the policy mix becomes, the graver the consequences for stability and the potential success of inflation targeting -it follows that the problem with inflation targeting is not so much whether it is pursued as how. In other words, it is the precise policy regime that is potentially harmful to economic performance in a monetary production economy, rather than the policy objective (of low inflation) per se.
These conclusions (and the results on which they are based) are robust to switching between the normal and the actual rate of interest in the pricing decision from which the aggregate Phillips curve relationship is derived.
At first sight, the conclusions reached above may seem to be nothing more than common sense, because unlike the orthodox policy regime, the Post Keynesian policy regime does not devote monetary policy to fighting inflation (with the attendant risk of antagonizing inflation through the cost channel, and thus establishing a de-stabilizing dynamic). But as our results demonstrate, the target of monetary policy is not, in fact, the key driver of macroeconomic stability and the associated efficacy of inflation targeting. On the contrary, it has been shown that none of our results -including the instability introduced by more orthodox policy measures -is in any way affected by the magnitude of the cost channel. Put differently, neither the efficacy of a Post Keynesian policy regime, nor the superiority of this regime relative to a more orthodox policy mix, is influenced by the existence of a cost channel of monetary policy.
This last point leads to a final and important conclusion when it is put into the context of Isaac's (1991, p.93) -regardless of whether monetary policy is considered in isolation (as in Isaac, 1991) or as part of a broader policy regime (as in our own analysis);
-regardless of whether the instrument of monetary policy is the quantity of money in circulation (as in Isaac, 1991) or the interest rate (as in our own analysis); and -regardless of whether or not a monetary policy conducted through the manipulation of interest rates is sensitive to the existence of the cost channel a robust finding of Post Keynesian macrodynamics is that in monetary production economies with conflicting claims inflation mechanisms, more orthodox policy regimes have unambiguously negative consequences for macro stabilization. What is required for successful stabilization is activist macroeconomic policy that is properly attuned to the intrinsic structures and properties of the economy.
It is obviously beyond the scope of this paper to reflect at length on the implications of this last conclusion for recent macroeconomic events. However, it is tempting to conjecture that: i) the Great Moderation was achieved neither through luck nor successful (orthodox) monetary policy so much as through changes to labour market institutions that resulted in the (unintentional?) creation of an "incomes policy based on fear," that held quiescent conflicting claims inflation mechanisms even as economies such as the US neared capacity (Setterfield, 2007) ii) the Great Recession represents, in some measure, the culmination of the inherent macroeconomic instability engendered by the pursuit of orthodox macroeconomic policies in a monetary production economy.
